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British	expatriates	and	the	anti-Brexit	backlash
A	large	number	of	British	citizens	live	elsewhere	in	Europe	and	many	have	the	right	to
vote	in	UK	elections.	Yet	little	is	known	about	their	political	preferences	given	there	are
no	designated	overseas	constituencies	for	expatriate	representation.	Drawing	on	new
survey	evidence,	Paul	Webb	and	Susan	Collard	write	that	while	expatriate	voters	have
traditionally	been	assumed	to	vote	more	often	for	the	Conservative	Party,	this	no	longer
seems	to	apply	for	those	living	in	EU	countries	following	Brexit.
New	research	shows	a	dramatic	increase	in	the	number	of	Britons	who	are	choosing	to	quit	the	UK	for	countries	in
the	European	Union.	Overall,	the	rate	of	migration	has	jumped	by	30%	since	the	Brexit	referendum	of	2016,	and
there	has	been	a	five-fold	increase	in	the	number	of	Brits	adopting	dual	citizenship	in	these	countries	(notably	in
Spain	and	France).
Even	so,	they	retain	the	legal	right	to	register	and	vote	in	UK	elections	–	at	least,	they	do	until	they	have	been
based	abroad	for	more	than	15	years.	But	what	are	the	political	preferences	of	British	migrants	who	vote	in	the	UK?
And,	more	particularly,	what	impact	if	any	has	Brexit	had	on	these	preferences?	We	are	able	to	shed	some	light	on
these	questions	in	a	new	paper.
Time-limited	voting	rights	for	expatriates	were	introduced	by	the	Conservative	Party	in	1985	after	the	creation	of
‘British	citizenship’	(as	opposed	to	‘Citizenship	of	the	UK	and	Colonies’)	by	the	1981	British	Nationality	Act.
Overseas	electors	are	‘assimilated’	into	the	system	of	650	parliamentary	constituencies	through	registration	in	their
last	place	of	residence.	The	time-limit	on	the	overseas	franchise	was	increased	under	the	Conservatives	in	1989
from	five	to	twenty	years	after	leaving	the	UK,	but	reduced	by	Labour	in	2000	to	the	current	‘15-year	rule’.
Historically,	the	issue	of	expatriate	enfranchisement	has	polarised	the	two	main	parties,	whose	attitudes	are
predominantly	informed	by	their	respective	expectations	of	electoral	gains	or	losses:	cultural	stereotypes	of	‘expats’
as	either	wealthy	or	retired	(or	both)	fuel	widely	shared	assumptions	that	the	majority	would	support	the
Conservative	Party.	Not	surprisingly,	therefore,	Labour	has	traditionally	opposed	extension	of	expatriate	voting
rights.
This	has	been	increasingly	contested	by	expatriate	campaigners	claiming	that	this	time	limit	is	arbitrary	and
anachronistic	in	the	internet	era,	but	legal	challenges	in	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	and	the	UK	courts
have	been	unsuccessful.	Although	the	‘Conservatives	Abroad’	expatriate	organisation	was	instrumental	in
persuading	the	party	leadership	to	include	a	2015	manifesto	pledge	to	deliver	‘Votes	For	Life’	(VFL),	the	promise
was	not	fulfilled	and	most	British	migrants	supporting	VFL	lost	faith	in	the	party’s	will	or	capacity	to	deliver	it.	Recent
developments	make	the	introduction	of	VFL	even	less	likely.
We	can	demonstrate	this	through	a	new	survey	of	Britons	living	in	the	EU	that	we	conducted	in	early	2020;	while
this	reveals	that	the	issue	of	VFL	itself	did	not	impact	significantly	on	their	voting	behaviour	in	2019,	Conservative
policy	on	Brexit	mattered	hugely	–	and	clearly	turned	them	against	the	party.	Only	17%	of	those	who	voted	for	the
party	in	2015	and	then	to	Remain	in	the	EU	in	the	2016	referendum	(that	is,	some	95%	of	all	2015	EU-based
Tories)	still	supported	the	Conservatives	in	2019;	by	contrast,	90%	of	Leave-voting	Tories	stuck	with	the	party	in
2019.
Both	Labour	and	the	Liberal	Democrats	benefitted	from	this	anti-Brexit	backlash	among	expatriates	in	the	general
election.	Even	so,	this	backlash	did	little	or	nothing	to	diminish	the	Conservatives’	resounding	victory	in	December
2019,	because	of	the	dispersion	of	overseas	voters	across	650	constituencies.
The	creation	of	designated	overseas	constituencies	for	expatriate	representation	(as	practised	by	countries	such	as
France,	Italy	and	Romania,	and	advocated	for	the	UK	by	the	Liberal	Democrats	since	2017),	would	address	this
question	of	representation.	However,	the	absence	of	accurate	data	on	the	size	and	geographical	distribution	of	the
expatriate	population,	not	to	mention	other	administrative	obstacles,	renders	implementation	problematic,	though
certainly	not	impossible.
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In	any	case,	if	Boris	Johnson’s	government	was	to	implement	its	2019	election	manifesto	pledge	to	legislate	for
VFL,	the	enfranchisement	of	a	further	three	million	UK	citizens	would	be	consistent	with	its	‘Global	Britain’	agenda.
But	despite	its	parliamentary	majority,	the	Brexit-induced	antipathy	of	EU-based	Britons	towards	the	Tories	revealed
by	our	research	would	seem	to	make	this	scenario	unlikely.	More	plausibly,	in	the	post-Brexit	era,	the	issue	of
expatriate	representation	seems	destined	to	return	to	the	margins	of	political	debate.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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